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The Value of Countermarketing Information to Smokers: 
Evidence from Field Auctions 
 
Abstract 
Information about cigarettes can help smokers come to an informed decision about what 
cigarettes to purchase.  Countermarketing information, which helps counter potentially 
biased marketing information, can fill this void, but little is known about the value of this 
information to smokers.  In this paper, we use data from experimental auctions to estimate 
the value of countermarketing information to smokers.  We find that countermarketing 
information has significant value to smokers who have been exposed to marketing 
information from tobacco companies, but we find no evidence it provides value to smokers 




Introduction and Background  
Quitting smoking is difficult for many smokers. This is largely due to the addictive 
nature of nicotine. Surveys of U.S. smokers suggest that although 70% of smokers say they 
want to quit and 34% of smokers try to quit each year, only 10% succeed in remaining 
tobacco free for at least a year (IOM, 2001). These facts indicate that a significant population 
will almost certainly remain at risk of the negative health effects of smoking, suggesting a 
role for harm reduction (i.e., a strategy to offer those smokers who cannot quit a “safer” 
alternative to cigarette smoking) (IOM, 2001).  
Recently, tobacco companies have tried to address smokers’ concerns about the 
health risks of smoking by offering new types of tobacco products claiming reduced health 
risks. These products have become known as PREPs (potentially reduced exposure products) 
(see IOM, 2001). Tobacco companies are seeking the support of the public health, regulatory, 
and medical communities in this effort (Shiffman et al., 2004).  Some of the claims for 
PREPs (e.g., advertising for Eclipse, a PREP offered by RJR Tobacco, states that Eclipse is 
“the next best choice” to quitting) (Shiffman et al., 2004) are reminiscent of claims made for 




RJR’s Eclipse cigarette may be the most well known of the alternative PREPs. Recent 
advertisements claimed that “there is no cigarette like [Eclipse]” (www.eclipse.rjrt.com) and 
that the cigarette, which heats rather than burns tobacco, “may present less risk of certain 
smoking-related illnesses” (www.eclipse.rjrt.com), including cancer, inflammation in the 
respiratory system, and development of cardiovascular disease (www.eclipse.rjrt.com; Slade, 
Connolly, and Lymperis, 2003).   
An independent study by the Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program, however, 
showed that Eclipse actually had higher levels of some carcinogens and reported that the 
Eclipse marketing campaign and claims were deceptive (Tomar, 2003).   
Marketing Information 
Efforts to produce lower risk cigarettes have largely been driven by public opinion—
in particular, by growing concerns about the health effects of smoking. Lowering the risk of 
tobacco products has been an option that tobacco companies have considered and pursued, in 
an attempt to satisfy demand in a “highly competitive market for ‘healthier’ products” 
(Dunsby and Bero, 2004, p. 362). The specific changes in tobacco products have also been 
driven by consumer opinion. After the Surgeon General’s report in 1964, which detailed the 
health risks many suspected, public concern about the effects of tobacco use rose and 
industry executives learned of the “profit opportunities inherent in products that made some 
cigarettes appear healthier” (Pollay and Dewhirts, 2002, p. i20). Modifications, such as the 
addition of a filter, were made to cigarettes so they appeared to limit “the cancer and other 
health risks being publicized” (Pollay and Dewhirts, 2002, p. i18). Consumer 
misunderstanding of the health risks of nicotine has even prompted tobacco companies to 
investigate development of a less addictive product if it were perceived to be healthier 
(Dunsby and Bero, 2004). 
However, it appears that the health claims for light and low-tar cigarettes have 
reached a health-conscious public. Use of light or mild cigarettes has increased substantially 
between 1996 and 2000 (Ashley, Cohen, and Ferrence, 2001), and more than half of adult 
and adolescent smokers report smoking light cigarettes (Cummings and Giovino, 2004). The 
effectiveness of marketing efforts are also found when looking at beliefs about light  
cigarettes.  Various studies have found smokers think light cigarettes are less dangerous than 
conventional cigarettes.  This includes smokers who perceived that smoking light cigarettes 
made them “less likely to get lung cancer, have a heart attack, die from a smoking-related 
disease, get a bad cough, have trouble breathing, and get wrinkles” (Kropp and Halpern-
Felsher, 2004 p. e445) and smokers who thought using light or ultra-light cigarettes would 
improve their health and reduce their chances of getting cancer or heart disease (Kropp and 
Halpern-Felsher, 2004; Shiffman et al., 2001a,b). With the advent of alternative tobacco 
products (e.g., Advance, Quest, Eclipse), it is likely that much of the misconceptions 
associated with light and low-tar cigarettes will be transferred to these PREPs.  
Hamilton et al. (2004) looked at smokers’ responses to advertisements for regular and 
light cigarettes and PREPs (e.g., Advance, Eclipse, and Omni). After reviewing one actual 
advertisement for each type of cigarette, they were asked to rank the level of health risk and 
to identify the main messages of the ads. Smokers believed that PREPs were less risky than 
light cigarettes and that light cigarettes were safer than regular cigarettes. Although analyses 
of the advertisements concluded that none explicitly detailed health benefits, smokers 
believed that light and PREP ads “convey[ed] positive messages about health and safety” (p. 
s353) and that the ads indicated that PREPs would be helpful in quitting smoking. 
Shiffman et al. (2004) also gauged reactions to PREP advertising, with similar results. 
After hearing claims made by Eclipse in its advertising, smokers and ex-smokers 
overwhelmingly believed that Eclipse was safer than regular cigarettes (91%), and nearly 
one-fourth “considered Eclipse to be completely safe” (p. 80). They concluded that smokers 
may reduce their readiness to quit based on interpretation of a reduced risk product’s ad.  
O’Hegarty et al (2007) used focus groups to assess adult smokers’ reactions to PREP 
print advertisements and promotional materials and found that these materials influenced 
participants’ decisions to try PREPs. A study by O’connor et al (2007) found that advertising 




There is evidence that antismoking or countermarketing campaigns can be effective 
in targeting users who are increasingly interested in these new products.  While some 
countermarketing campaigns simply try to discourage all smoking, others take a different 
approach.  With light cigarettes, for example, the goal of a countermarketing campaign is not 
directly to tell people of the immediate risks of smoking.  The direct goal is to inform 
smokers that light cigarettes are not safer than conventional cigarettes.  When this first goal 
occurs, then smokers who may consider quitting will be less likely to instead choose to 
switch to light cigarettes.  Research has found this strategy has some merit, as there is 
evidence that smokers would be more likely to quit if they understood that using light 
cigarettes did not significantly reduce health risks (Ashley, Cohen, and Ferrence, 2001; 
Kozlowski et al., 1998, Shiffman et al., 2001a,b). 
This type of information strategy may be useful for PREPs, as well.  A recent study 
by Biener, et al. (2007) examined smokers’ beliefs about the toxicity and health risks 
associated with PREP’s (Advance and Eclipse) and the effect of corrective health 
information on these beliefs. They reported that corrective health information had an effect 
on ratings of health risks and reduced perceptions that switching to a PREP would lower the 
risk of cancer though smokers’ rating of toxicity were not effected by the corrective health 
information.  
In this study, we create an experimental auction to value countermarekting 
information that is designed to accurately inform participants about PREPs.  In our design, 
the information is not directly attempting to inform smokers in such a way that they quit 
smoking entirely, but simply to provide smokers with more accurate information about 
PREPs.  Those in public health fields would hope that this step will then help those who are 
considering quitting choose to quit and not choose to switch to a PREPs cigarette because 
they are misinformed about the risks.  We assess the value of countermarketing information 
by examining how more-informed smokers make a choice between regular and conventional 
cigarettes by using experimental auctions.     
      
Experimental Design 
Experimental auctions have been use to estimate the consumer demand for a dozens 
of products and recent studies have used experimental auctions to examine smokers’ demand 
for cigarettes (Monchuk et al., 2007; Thrasher et al. 2007).  Experimental auctions have also 
been used to examine whether information has value to consumers.  Several different studies 
have used experimental auctions to measure the value of information on items such as GM 
foods and choice of fish (Rousu et al. 2007, Marette et al. 2008)   
We designed and conducted an experimental auction to examine the value of 
countermarketing information about PREPs to smokers.  Because many smokers purchase 
cigarettes at grocery stores, we conducted our field experiment in grocery stores. (e.g., see 
Rousu et al. 2005, Monchuk et al. 2007).  According to Harrison and List’s (2004) taxonomy, 
this would be considered a “framed field experiment”.  
We posted signs inside the grocery store indicating that smokers could earn $15
1 for 
10 to 15 minutes of their time on a research project for Susquehanna University. For legal 
and ethical reasons, we limited our sample to adults who were 18 years of age or older. The 
experiment monitors checked the participant’s photo identification when the participant 
looked younger than 28 years old.  We also assume in our analysis that when an auction 
participant purchases a pack of cigarettes, that they are the end consumers. This is essentially 
the same as assuming that when a smoker purchases a regular pack of cigarettes they intend 
to consume the cigarettes. In an attempt to ensure the participants in our experiment were 
end-users, we asked all potential participants if they were (currently) smokers and limited our 
sample to those individuals.  
We conducted our field experiments in December 2006 and January 2007.  Four 
hundred and four
2 participants took part in this study in groups of either one-at-a-time or six 
or fewer, depending on how many other people were interested in participating at the same 
time.  The experiments were conducted at grocery stores in four locations, Laurel, MD; 
Harrisburg, PA; Allentown, PA; and Selinsgrove, PA.  We chose these four locations for 
several reasons.  First, the grocery store chain that allowed us to conduct the experiments had 
branches in each of these locations.
3  Second, using multiple locations helped us obtain a 
more-diverse sample than if we had chosen one area. One store was in a rural area 
(Selinsgrove, population 5,300), two were in mid-size cities (Harrisburg has a population of 
49,000 while Allentown has a population of 106,000) while Laurel is a suburb of major 
                                                 
1 Some participants received only $10.  This occurred on the first day of experiments with only 12 individuals.  
We struggled to recruit smokers with only a $10 incentive payment, so we increased the incentive payment to 
$15 for the all other participants.   
2 While 404 people participated, we collected incomplete bid information from nine of these participants, 
leaving us with a sample of 395 participants.   
3 We attempted to run experiments in other locations (e.g. Miami, FL; Durham, NC) but were unable to obtain 
to run experiments in these areas as the stores we contacted would not allow us to conduct experiments in their 
stores.    
metropolitan areas (Washington, DC and Baltimore, MD).    Table 1 summarizes the 
characteristics of our sample.   
The auction mechanism 
 
For this study, we used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) (1964) auction, which 
is designed to encourage participants to truthfully identify a products value. In the BDM 
auction, after each participant places a bid for a product, a market-clearing price from a 
uniform distribution is selected randomly from a fixed interval of prices.   In this experiment, 
the possible market clearing prices ranged from $0.10 to $6.00 in increments of $0.10. If a 
participant bids more than the randomly selected price, he or she purchases the product for 
the market-clearing price; a participant who bids less than the selected price does not 
purchase the product.  The BDM auction is a “demand-revealing” auction, that is, each 
participant’s best strategy is to place a bid that is equal to the amount he or she would pay for 
the cigarettes.  It is in a participant’s best interest to bid his or her true value for the product 
because a bid higher than the true value may result in paying a higher price than what he or 
she was willing to pay, and a bid lower than the true value may result in not being able to 
purchase the good at a price he or she was willing to pay.  For more on the properties of this 
auction, see Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964).  
 
The cigarettes 
Participants in our experiment bid on Eclipse cigarettes.  RJR’s Eclipse cigarette may 
be the most well known of the alternative PREPs. We had participants bid on both regular 
and menthol Eclipse, as some smokers in our sample preferred menthol cigarettes, while 
others preferred regular (non-menthol) cigarettes.  In addition to bidding on the two packs of 
Eclipse cigarettes, participants indicated to us the brand of cigarettes they usually smoke  
(henceforth referred to as their “regular brand”).  Participants placed three separate bids on 
each of the three packs of cigarettes (Eclipse regular, Eclipse menthol, and their regular 
brand).  This allows us to compare participants’ demand for Eclipse relative to their regular 
brand, along with the ability to compare how information affects participants’ preferences for 
Eclipse.  
The information treatments 
  We wanted to estimate the value of countermarketing information both for consumers 
who received marketing information and for consumers who did not receive marketing 
information.  With that in mind, we now summarize the information treatments. The 
information statements given to consumers can be found in appendix 1.   
In treatment A (the control group), Participants received no information prior to 
bidding on the cigarettes.  In treatment B, participants received (only) countermarketing 
information (about PREPs) prior to bidding on cigarettes.   In treatment C, participants 
received marketing information (about PREPs) prior to bidding on cigarettes. Finally, in 
treatment D participants received both marketing and countermarketing information about 
PREPs.   
There were two alternative types of both marketing and countermarketing information 
provided to participants.  Both types of marketing information came from the Reynolds 
website (www.eclipse.rjrt.com). One of these messages emphasized potential health benefits 
of Eclipse in terms of reduced exposure to carcinogens. The other message suggested Eclipse 
as an alternative to quitting.  The two types of countermarketing information were designed 
to counter each of the specific marketing claims. Note that within treatments B, C, and D, 
participants only received one of the two types of marketing and/or countermarketing  
information.  (For treatment D, groups received the countermarketing information that was 
designed to counter the specific marketing claim.) 
Steps in the Experiment 
After prospective participants read and signed consent forms we gave them 
experimental packets (which can be obtained by the authors upon request) and explained the 
BDM auction mechanism and answered any questions from participants. We next conducted 
a practice round in which we collected separate bids for two candy bars. This practice round 
demonstrated to participants that it was truly in their best interests to bid only their true value 
for a good in the auction—no more and no less. We also explained that, when participants 
bid on multiple products, only one product, chosen at random, would be auctioned. This 
avoids the possibility of participants purchasing multiple products that are similar and avoids 
any potential substitution effects. When the bidding for the candy bars ended, we determined 
whether the participant would purchase the randomly selected candy bar and at what price. 
Following the practice round participants (who were not in the control group) were 
given information to read based on their treatment.  The information they received was 
randomly determined based on the time they arrived.  After participants read the information, 
bidding on the cigarettes began. Following Monchuk et al. (2007), we had participants 
indicate the brand of cigarettes they normally smoke (henceforth referred to as their “regular 
brand”).
 4  A package of each participant’s regular brand of cigarettes was immediately 
purchased, if their specific brand was not already on hand, and displayed with the two 
packages of Eclipse cigarettes, regular and menthol. We then asked the participants to rank 
the three packs before them from most to least preferred. Once the consumers ranked the 
                                                 
4 Note that it was feasible that a participant would indicate that his or her preferred brand was a PREP, but this 
did not occur in our experiments.  
cigarettes, we asked them to place a separate bid for each of the three packs of cigarettes. 
Before they placed their bids, however, we reiterated that, similar to the candy bar round, 
only one of the three packs of cigarettes, chosen at random, would be sold in the auction.  
Next the pack of cigarettes to be sold was randomly determined, as was the market-
clearing price to determine whether a participant won the pack of cigarettes. Finally, 
participants completed a short post-auction questionnaire, were paid $15 for their 
participation and those who won the auction purchased cigarettes at the selected market-
clearing price. 
While our experiment follows standard procedures (e.g., see Shogren et al. (1994) and 
Lusk et al. 2001), we make several notable refinements.  First, instead of a laboratory 
experiment, we conducted a “framed field experiment” (Harrison and List (2004)).  Several 
recent experimental auctions have been conducted in a field setting (e.g., see Rousu et al. 
2005, Lusk et al. 2001) because of the associated benefits. Chief among these is that the field 
environment is more familiar to participants.  Second, we use adult consumers from four 
distinct geographic regions.  This ensures our results are not an artifact of one geographic 
region.  Finally, we chose not to endow participants with products and have them bid to 
upgrade to another product (e.g. see Alfnes and Rickertsen (2003)).  Recent research has 
shown that there is an "endowment effect" that distorts bids (see Corrigan and Rousu 
(2006)).   
 
Modeling the Value of Information 
We now summarize the methodology used to estimate the value of countermarketing 
information. First, consider the empirical specification of the model leading to the public- 
good value of countermarketing information.  Our approach is similar to the approach taken 
by Rousu et al. (2007, 2004) to value information using an experimental auction and to the 
non-auction approaches to value information used in Foster and Just (1989), Teisl et al. 
(2001), and Marette et al. (2007).  Information has value if an agent’s observable behavior 
changes.   For our case, information has social value if a participant/consumer changes 
his/her behavior as a result of receiving the information, i.e., they “switched products that 
they purchased” — from  Eclipse cigarettes to regular cigarettes, or vice versa.
5   
Consider the two types of bidders that benefit from countermarketing information.  
One type purchases the brand of cigarettes they normally purchase (their “regular brand”) 
before receiving countermarketing information, and then switches to Eclipse cigarettes after 
receiving countermarketing information.  The second type purchases Eclipse cigarettes 
before receiving countermarketing information, and switches to their regular brand after 
receiving the countermarketing information. 
The economist’s task is to approximate the net welfare change for bidders who 
change their observed behavior after receiving countermarketing information.  Because we 
are trying to assess the average value of information for cigarettes, we assume all bidders 
purchase either their regular brand of cigarettes (which differed across individuals) or the 
Eclipse cigarettes.  The bidder’s surplus is approximated by the difference between his/her 
willingness to pay (WTP) and the “market price” (i.e., the price consumers would pay for a 
product in a store) for the product he/she purchases.  Bidder j’s consumer surplus from 







ECL MP WTP surplus − =  
                                                 
5 Note that our model does not assume an auction market, but a conventional market.  But, auctions are essential 
for this analysis because our auction market elicits the non-hypothetical WTP under different information 







REG MP WTP surplus − = . 
In equations (1) and (2), the bidder's WTP is revealed in the experimental auctions, 
MP is the price the bidder faces for the product in the marketplace, the superscript j refers to 
bidder j, and the subscripts ECL and REG refer to the Eclipse and regular versions of 
cigarettes.
6   
We assume a consumer is facing a decision in a market to purchase either the Eclipse 
or their regular brand of cigarettes.  The product that bidder j purchases is assumed to be the 





ECL surplus surplus > then   1 _   =
j
I ECL buy  and 0 _    =
j
I REG buy ,  




REG surplus surplus < then   0 _   =
j
I ECL buy  and 1 _   =
j
I REG buy ,  
where the subscript I refers to the information setting (whether or not the consumer has 
received countermarketing information).  When a bidder purchase the product that gives 
him/her a higher surplus, we say the get earn a premium of surplus above and beyond the 
consumer surplus they would gain from purchasing the other product.  Those who purchase 
the Eclipse cigarettes gain a premium of: 






ECL surplus surplus PREMGAIN − = . 








REG surplus surplus PREMGAIN − = . 
                                                 
6 To compute this value of countermarketing information, we need to estimate market prices for cigarettes.  
Each participant indicated his/her regular brand, and we used 2006 Neilson data from the state in which the 
cigarettes were sold to estimate prices for the regular brand.  For Eclipse cigarettes, we used an estimated price 
of $3.75.  We also used several alternative prices to examine the sensitivity of our results to the assumed price 
for Eclipse cigarettes, which are available upon request.  
Although all bidders enjoy the premium gained by consuming one product instead of another, 
as shown in expressions (3) and (4), the premium gained represents the increase in welfare 
(i.e., the value of information) only for those who switch products.   
  We next discuss the method used to estimate the percentage of bidders who change 
purchases when information is introduced.   First, the percentage of bidders who purchase 













Equation (5) shows that this number can be represented as the summation across bidders that 
purchase the Eclipse cigarettes given the information treatment, I, divided by the total 
number of bidders.  Therefore, the percentage of bidders who purchase the regular brand of 
cigarettes version is 1-percentbuyECLI. 
Information causes a bidder to switch purchases if his or her surplus for one version 
(e.g., the regular cigarettes) prior to receiving countermarketing information, but higher 
consumer surplus for the other version (e.g., the Eclipse cigarettes) after receiving 
information.  The net change in the percentage who purchase regular cigarettes due to the 
introduction of countermarketing information is the (absolute) difference between the 
“percentage who purchase Eclipse cigarettes when treated to countermarketing information” 
and the “percentage who purchase Eclipse cigarettes but do not receive the countermarketing 
information” given the other information they have received: 
(6) 
K
Counter no Counter Percentswitch percentbuyECL percentbuyECL − =− . 
In equation (6), the percentage of bidders who switched purchases is estimated as the 
absolute value of the difference in the percentage that purchase Eclipse cigarettes with and  
without countermarekting information.  We will estimate the percentage of bidders who 
switched for two information settings: one where participants have been treated to marketing 
information and one where they have not.  The superscript K represents either Eclipse 
cigarettes or regular cigarettes, depending on which product bidders are switching to.      
Who switches purchases once countermarketing information is introduced?  Because 
bidders who receive different information treatments are in distinct experimental sessions, we 
do not know the specific persons who switch, but we can compute the percentage of the 
sample that switched after the introduction of countermarketing information.  To do this, we 
assume that the bidders who switch have relative preferences for cigarettes that are uniformly 
distributed across the population that consumes the good that was abandoned.  For example, 
we assume that bidders who switched to regular cigarettes after receiving countermarketing 
information had relative valuations of plain-labeled foods that were evenly distributed 
throughout the population of consumers who purchased the plain-labeled foods before 
information was introduced. Thus, without countermarketing information, treated and 
untreated participants have the same behavior.   
We now compute the probability of a participant being a "switcher"—one who 

















To determine the expected value of countermarketing information to a participant, we 
multiply his or her premium surplus (PREMGAIN) by the probability that he or she switched 













In equation (9), EVperson
j is the expected value of information to bidder j.
7  One can also 
think of this as the average value of countermarketing information across all bidders or 
participants.  It is also important that we compute this value for both initial information 
treatments: the control treatment (receiving no other information) and the marketing 
treatment (receiving marketing information).   
Next we need the expected value of information to a bidder who switches purchases.  
This is computed by dividing the expected value of countermarketing information per person 







In equation (10), EVswitcher  is the average value of countermarketing information to a 
bidder who switches his or her purchase of cigarettes, either to Eclipse cigarettes from 
regular, or vice versa.
8  
In summary, the experimental auction data collected for this study allow us to 
calculate the percentage of bidders who switch in each of the information settings:  receiving 
no marketing information and receiving marketing information.  We then estimate an 
expected value of countermarketing information per experiment participant/bidder. 
 
Results 
                                                 
7 Note that because it is assumed that auction participants consume either Eclipse or regular cigarettes, only one 
of the two PREMGAIN coefficients will be positive while the other is zero.  The PREMGAIN coefficients will 
also differ across participants. 
8 The SAS code used to estimate the value of information is available from the authors upon request.  
Participant bids are presented in table 2.
9  Bids are segregated to show the impact of 
countermarketing information on bids both when marketing information is not presented and 
when marketing information is presented to smokers.  Recall that each participant bid on 
both menthol Eclipse and regular (non-menthol) Eclipse cigarettes.  We create a variable we 
call “preferred Eclipse”, which simply takes the higher of the two bids.  We do this because a 
participant will normally only purchase either menthol or non-menthol cigarettes, but not 
both.  The higher bid represents the pack of cigarettes the smoker would prefer.   Several 
facts are worth noting.  First, participants bid less for the preferred Eclipse brand than for 
their preferred brand of cigarettes.  This seems logical, since participants’ preferred brand is 
the brand they usually smoke.  It seems logical that they would have a greater demand for 
that pack of cigarettes.  Second, the countermarketing information appears to decrease mean 
bids for Eclipse cigarettes, but it also seems to decrease bids for participants’ preferred brand 
of cigarettes.   
While examining participant’s bids can be instructive, it does not give us information 
on whether participants gain value from countermarketing information.  To determine the 
value of information, we must compare bids to market prices and estimate the percentage of 
participants that would switch purchases when presented with countermarketing information.  
Table 3 presents the results for the percentage of participants that would purchase Eclipse 
cigarettes under alternative information treatments.  When marketing information is absent, 
there is no statistically significant difference between the percentage of participants that 
                                                 
9 Recall that we presented participants with two types of marketing and countermarketing information.  We 
present the combined results of the two marketing and countermarketing information sources.  The reason is 
that for the important variables of interest in this paper, comparing the number of people who would switch 
purchases and the value of information, we did not find a statistically significant differences between the two 
types of marketing information; nor did we find a statistically significant differences between the two types of 
countermarketing information.  
would purchase Eclipse vs. their regular brand.  This is consistent with research that indicates 
that some smokers are not receptive to countermarketing information presented to them 
(Nonnemaker, Davis, Farrelly, and Crankshaw, 2008).  However, when marketing 
information is present, we find that 18.6% of participants would purchase Eclipse cigarettes 
when they are not presented with countermarketing information, while only 11.6% would 
purchase Eclipse when presented in conjunction with marketing information.  Thus, 
countermarketing information is effective in persuading smokers not to use Eclipse, but only 
for those smokers who have also been exposed to marketing information.    
  While table 3 shows us that some participants would switch away from PREP 
cigarettes when treated to countermarketing information, it does not show the value of 
countermarketing information.  In table 4 we quantify the value of countermarketing 
information to participants.  For those who don’t receive marketing information, the value of 
countermarketing information is essentially worthless.  It is worth a nickel per pack for those 
who switch – although switchers here are switching to Eclipse cigarettes.  With so few 
participants switching, however, the average value per smoker/per pack is approximately 
1/10 of a penny.   
Participants who receive marketing information, however, gain a considerable 
amount from countermarketing information.  Those who switch purchases gain an average 
value of $1.22 per pack resulting in an average value per smoker/per pack of 8.5 cents.  
Considering estimates there are billions of packs sold in the US annually, this information 
has a large value to smokers.  If there are additional benefits in that the information may 
prevent some people who would switch to a perceived “safer” cigarette to instead quit, the 
annual value could be considerably higher.    
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
  Accurate information on cigarettes and smoking could have tremendous value to 
smokers.  This is especially true because marketing information by tobacco companies has 
been very influential over the years, especially as newer products, like light cigarettes, have 
been introduced.  Accurate countermarketing could help inform participants to make the 
optimal decisions for themselves given their personal preferences.  We designed and 
implemented an experimental auction to assess the value of countermarketing information.  
  We find that no evidence suggesting that countermarketing information has an effect 
on smokers behavior when smokers are not presented with marketing information.  However, 
for smokers who are presented with marketing information, we find that countermarketing 
information has an average value per smoker in society of 8.5 cents per pack, and this value 
is much larger for the subset of smokers who actually change their smoking behavior because 
of countermarketing information.  Further, since our estimate is only for smokers, our 
estimates may be an underestimate.  If non-smokers were influenced by this type of 
information, there could be additional value, although this value can’t be quantified through 
auction procedures.   
  It is important to be cautious in interpreting these results.  Some anti-smoking 
advocates may disagree that countermarketing information could have value if smokers still 
choose to smoker.  However, others would correctly point out that not all countermarketing 
information is designed to get smokers to quit immediately.  Our goal of this study, however, 
was not to get into that argument, to but to examine the value of accurate countermarketing  
information to smokers, given that accurate information should have value in helping 
smokers make a more informed decision.    
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Table 1: Demographic and background information of participants 
Table 1. Variables for auction participants-bidders and sample summary statistics (N = 
395) 
 
                                                                                                                                   
___________________________________________________________________________
___       
Variable  Definitions                                                                      Mean    St. Dev.   
Selinsgrove  1 if the subject participated in Selinsgrove, PA  0.35   
Harrisburg  1 if the subject participated in Selinsgrove, PA  0.21   
Laurel  1 if the subject participated in Laurel, MD  0.25   
Allentown  1 if the subject participated in Allentown, PA  0.19   
Gender  1 if female  0.44  0.50 
Age  The participant’s age  38.6  16.3 
White  1 if participant is white  0.79   
Black  1 if participant is black  0.14   
Hispanic/ 
Latino 
1 if the participant is Hispanic or Latino  0.09   
None  1 if the participant received neither marketing nor 
countermarketing information  
.195  
Marketing  1 if the participant received only marketing information   .258   
Counter  1 if the participant received only countermarketing 
information 
.263  
Both  1 if the participant received both marketing and 





Table 2: Smokers bids for cigarettes under alternative information treatments 
Part A: Mean and Median bids when marketing information is not given to participants 















Eclipse Regular  $2.12  $2.14  $2.25   $2.00 
Eclipse Menthol  $2.08  $1.83  $2.00   $2.00 
Preferred Eclipse  $2.48  $2.37  $3.00   $2.50 
Regular Brand  $3.71  $3.61  $4.00   $3.50 
Difference between 
Preferred Eclipse 
and Regular Brand 
$1.22 $1.23  $1.00    $1.00 
 
Part B: Mean and Median bids when marketing information is given to participants 



















Eclipse Regular  $1.82  $1.82  $2.00   $2.00 
Eclipse Menthol  $1.77  $1.51  $2.00   $1.50 
Preferred Eclipse  $2.25  $2.09  $2.28   $2.00 
Regular Brand  $3.47  $3.23  $3.62   $3.55 
Difference between 
Preferred Eclipse and 
Regular Brand 
$1.22 $1.19  $1.00    $1.00  
Table 3: Percentage who would buy Eclipse cigarettes with and without countermarketing 
information 
    % who would 
buy Eclipse 
cigarettes 




The impact of 
information when no 
marketing information 
is presented (N=181) 





      




is presented (N=214) 




      
* Statistically significant at the 10% level using a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level using a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level using a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
 
Table 4: Value of Countermarketing Information to Smokers 
  Value to a smoker 
who switches 
Average value of 
information to all smokers 
The value of 




    







** Statistically significant at the 10% level using a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level using a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level using a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test   
Steps in the experiment  
   









             Step 4 
 
 Step  3                       
   
 


























Only marketing information 
Real Auctions 
with the three 
cigarettes 
Participants 
filled out a short 
questionnaire 
and were paid 
Both marketing and 
countermarketing information 
Determine which 
product is auctioned, 
whether participant 
won, and the price.  
 
Appendix 1: Information given to participants.   
Marketing Information  
Version A 
Extensive analysis of Eclipse shows that the smoke it creates contains far less of 
many of the compounds that have been linked to the risk of cancer and associated with 
certain other smoking-related illnesses. 
Version B 
Eclipse is for smokers who have decided not to quit but who are interested in a 
cigarette that responds to concerns about certain smoking-related illnesses, including cancer. 
For many smokers, it may well be a better way to smoke. 
Countermarketing Information  
Version A 
Scientific studies show that smoke from Eclipse contains at least as many chemicals 
linked to the risk of cancer and other smoking-related illnesses as regular cigarettes. 
Version B  
The best choice for smokers who are worried about their health is to quit. Smokers of 
Eclipse cigarettes are still using tobacco and are not reducing their risk of smoking-related 
illnesses, including cancer. For all smokers, it is better to stop smoking completely. 
 
 
 